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The contract manager is the primary inter-
face between government and industry on 
all contractual matters. On the government 
side, it is the contracting officer leading the 
market research aspect of the procurement 
planning phase—interfacing with external 
stakeholders and interested offerors in 
industry. During the solicitation planning 
phase, the contracting officer interfaces 
with internal stakeholders in developing the 
solicitation documents, such as the perfor-
mance work statement and specifications, 
as well as in structuring the contract terms 
and conditions. During the solicitation 
phase, the contracting officer again inter-
faces with industry through the government 
point of entry (i.e., www.fedbizopps.gov) 
in posting solicitations, notices concerning 
industry information sessions, as well as in 
conducting pre-solicitation and pre-proposal 
conferences. During the source selection 
phase, it is again the contracting officer 
ETHICS CORNER
Ethics Advocacy Requires Knowledge of 
Internal Controls
BY RENE RENDON
In a recent Journal of 
Contract Management 
article,1 the authors 
state that because of 
the contract manager’s 
unique position in the 
organization, he or she 
is “among the first to 
identify external risks 
to the integrity of [his or 
her] organizations and 
should be empowered 
to act and to deal 
with these situations 
appropriately.”2 This 
is an excellent point, 
and doesn’t appear 
to be emphasized as 
much as it should. The 
contract manager’s 
unique position enables 
him or her to be an 
ethics advocate for the 
organization. 
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who is the main interface with the offerors 
during the evaluation of proposals, discus-
sions, and price negotiations. Finally, during 
the contract administration and contract 
closeout phases, the contracting officer 
and the contracting officer’s representative 
(COR) are the primary contacts with the 
contractor in overseeing, assessing, and 
documenting the contractor’s performance. 
In performing these critical contract 
management activities, the contract man-
ager should be among the first to identify 
external risks to the integrity of his or her 
organization and should be empowered to 
act and to deal with these situations ap-
propriately. However, in order to effectively 
perform these roles, contract managers 
must be knowledgeable about these 
contract management processes, and more 
important, they must be knowledgeable 
about the internal controls—as well as the 
implications of these internal controls—on 
the organization’s vulnerability to unethical 
behavior, such as procurement fraud.  
In a recent research study,3 approximately 
99 federal government contracting officers 
were surveyed to assess their knowledge of 
procurement internal controls and related 
fraud schemes, as well as their perception 
of their organizations’ vulnerability to pro-
curement fraud. The survey consisted of 26 
knowledge-based questions on procurement 
internal controls and fraud schemes and 12 
perception-based questions regarding their 
organizations’ vulnerabilities to procure-
ment fraud. Of the surveyed contracting of-
ficers, the median score on the knowledge-
based questions was 63 percent (the scores 
ranged from 46 percent to 70 percent). 
Using a traditional college grading protocol, 
this would equate to a grade of “D.” Addi-
tionally, in the survey item “I have adequate 
knowledge of contracting fraud schemes 
to perform my duties,” the mean response 
was a 3.90, which equates to approximately 
“Agree” on a Likert scale of 1 (“Strongly 
Disagree”) to 5 (“Strongly Agree”). Finally, 
in the survey item “To which procurement 
fraud scheme is your organization most 
susceptible?” approximately 53 percent of 
the contracting officers responded “I do not 
suspect fraud.” 
This research was limited by a small 
survey sample, and the results may not be 
representative of the federal government 
contracting workforce. However, there are 
some interesting implications from these 
findings. The results of this research suggest 
there is some variance in the knowledge 
level regarding procurement internal con-
trols and related fraud schemes among the 
surveyed contracting workforce. Although 
the contracting officers scored an average 
of 63 percent in the knowledge assessment, 
the respondents, on average, agreed that 
they have an adequate knowledge level of 
internal controls and related fraud schemes 
to perform their duties. In addition, over 
half of the contracting officers stated that 
they did not suspect fraud in their organiza-
tions. These findings suggest that perhaps 
the surveyed contracting workforce is overly 
optimistic in self-assessing their knowledge 
of procurement internal controls and re-
lated fraud schemes. Additionally, this over-
optimism in their knowledge of procurement 
internal controls and related fraud schemes 
may result in their organizations being 
vulnerable to some form of procurement 
fraud.  Furthermore, these research findings 
indicate that perhaps government agencies 
are not emphasizing procurement internal 
controls in their contracting workforce com-
petencies, which may be contributing to 
an increased vulnerability for procurement 
fraud in their organizations.  
If the contract manager is, in fact, in a 
unique organizational position to be the 
first to identify external risks to the integ-
rity of the organization, then the contract 
manager must be knowledgeable of procure-
ment internal controls. This knowledge is 
also imperative for the contract manager to 
be empowered to deal with these situations 
appropriately. Contract managers must also 
be knowledgeable of the implications of 
these internal controls on the organization’s 
vulnerability for unethical behavior, such as 
procurement fraud. 
Government agencies should review their 
training programs to ensure competencies 
in procurement internal controls and related 
fraud schemes are sufficiently emphasized. 
These training programs should include 
an understanding of the internal control 
components and how they are integrated 
in the contract management process. Ad-
ditionally, the contracting workforce should 
understand the relationship between inef-
fective internal controls and the resultant 
fraud vulnerabilities within each contract 
management process phase. Only then can 
contracting officers be successful in identi-
fying external risks to the integrity of their 
organizations and truly be empowered to 
deal with these situations appropriately. CM
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